In recent years, there has been growing interest in systems for sharing resources, which were originally used for personal purposes by individual users, among many unspecified users via a network. An example of such systems is a peer-to-peer (P2P) data storage system that enables users to share a portion of unused space in their own storage devices among themselves. In a recent paper on a P2P data storage system, the user behavior model was defined based on supply and demand functions that depend only on the storage space unit price in a virtual marketplace. However, it was implicitly assumed that other factors, such as unused space of storage devices possessed by users and additional storage space asked by users, did not affect the characteristics of the supply and demand functions. In addition, it was not clear how the values of parameters used in the user behavior model were determined. Therefore, in this paper, we modify the supply and demand functions and determine the values of their parameters by taking the above mentioned factors as well as the price structure of storage devices in a real marketplace into account. Moreover, we provide a numerical example to evaluate the social welfare realized by the P2P data storage system as a typical application of the modified supply and demand functions. key words: P2P data storage system, user behavior, supply and demand functions
Introduction
As a new paradigm for providing services over a network, there has been growing interest in an on-demand system that enables many unspecified users to share just the amount of resources needed at the time they are needed, and the resources possessed by individual users are provided to other users via a network. Examples of such a system include P2P systems, in which computational power, storage space, etc. are shared over a network, cognitive radio, in which a radio frequency band is shared, and next-generation power transmission grids (smart grids), in which ordinary households can share electrical power, such as solar power and power stored in electric vehicle batteries. Future networks that must meet advanced and diverse needs are expected to realize general and large-scale resource sharing via a decentralized and interactive system as demonstrated in these examples.
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higher functionality and performance by sharing resources that individual users possess but are not fully utilized among multiple users. Therefore, good understanding of user behavior characteristics is important to achieve those objectives. For that reason, this paper investigates a user behavior model for transactions of resources in a virtual market, where individual users share resources provided over a network with many unspecified users.
In this paper, we are particularly interested in a user behavior model for transactions of storage space in a virtual market constructed over a P2P system. Maille and Toka [1] have used a user behavior model that represented the relationship between supply and demand for storage space transactions in a P2P data storage system, in which many unspecified users shared their own storage space. However, the supply and demand functions used in that model depended only on the storage space unit price in the virtual market. In addition, storage usage state and storage usage requirement were not considered in the definition of functions. There was also no explanation of how the unit price was determined in this virtual market. For those reasons, we model realistic demand and supply functions by taking the storage usage state, storage usage requirement, and storage device price structure in a real market into account. To do this, we referred to product information available on Kakaku.com [2] , which is a Web site for comparing the prices of various products, including computer devices. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of related work on the P2P data storage system and user behavior model. Section 3 discusses a modified user behavior model. Section 4 provides a numerical example of applying the modified user behavior model to evaluate the result of transactions over the P2P data storage system. Section 5 concludes the paper with a summary. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of related work on the P2P data storage system and user behavior model. Section 3 discusses a modified user behavior model. Section 4 provides a numerical example of applying the modified user behavior model to evaluate the result of transactions over the P2P data storage system. Section 5 concludes the paper with a summary.
Related Work
The concept of the P2P model is completely different from that of a conventional client-server model. While a conventional client-server model explicitly distinguishes hosts Copyright c 2015 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers providing services (servers) from hosts receiving services (clients), a P2P model does not assign fixed roles to hosts. Hosts composed of P2P systems, referred to as peers, can be both servers and clients, so P2P systems can theoretically function as autonomous distributed cooperative systems. One of the applications of P2P systems is a distributed data storage system, which enables large amounts of data to be stored without the need for a costly storage server.
One of the earliest research projects on the P2P data storage system was Oceanstore [3], which is a global persistent data storage system designed to scale to billions of users. Another of the earliest research projects was Farsite [4] , which is a serverless distributed system that does not assume mutual trust among the client computers on which it runs. A more recent example of a distributed P2P data storage system is Wuala [5] , which provides a secure online storage service. On the other hand, the use of an incentive mechanism and market design to maintain the system has attracted a lot of interest [1] , [6] - [8] . For example, in the P2P data storage system described by Maille and Toka [1] , each user uses some storage space in the system and provides some of his or her own storage space to the system. They propose a symmetric scheme and profit-oriented pricing scheme as two policies for creating the incentive to maintain the system.
In a symmetric scheme, each user is required to provide at least as much storage space as he or she is using, and there is no financial transaction involved. In this scheme, there is no financial incentive for individual users, but there is an incentive to determine the amount of storage space that is used and provided so as to maximize the utility gained by using the system.
With the profit-oriented pricing scheme, on the other hand, the operator operates and manages a P2P data storage system as a business. The policy is that individual users pay a unit price of p s (the superscript s refers to 'store') for use of storage space on the system and receive a unit price of p o (the superscript o refers to 'offer') when they provide their own storage space to the system. Users pay for the amount of storage space of the system they used and receive payment for the amount of storage space they provided to the system. From the operator's viewpoint, p s is the unit price for selling storage space to users and p o is the unit price for buying storage space from users. The operator sets the unit prices p s and p o to balance the amount of storage space bought from and sold to users so as to eliminate dead inventory and extract a profit from the difference in sales and purchases. Here, the operator fairly applies the same unit prices p o and p s to all users. In that way, a market in which users buy and sell storage resources is established in a P2P data storage system. In this scheme, the operator has an incentive to set the prices so as to maximize his or her own profit.
As a criterion for comparing the advantages and disadvantages of these schemes, they used the concept of social welfare. Social welfare is defined as the sum of the utility gained by each user using the system and the income and expenditures of the operator. They then calculate the maximum value of social welfare for the two schemes and judge the policy that provides the highest social welfare as the superior scheme. The supply function s i (·) and demand function d i (·) that are used to determine the utility for user i (i ∈ I, where I is the set of all users) are defined as follows.
In ). These parameters are referred to as the price sensitivities.
However, they did not discuss a method for determining the values of the four parameters, p
, a i , and b i , that characterize the supply function s i (·) and the demand function d i (·) for user i. Another issue is that those functions are independent of the storage usage state and storage usage requirement. Although economic modeling and/or analysis for the P2P data storage system and related systems have been discussed in many other studies (e.g., [6] , [9] - [11] ), the utility functions used for the discussion were not defined specifically. For those reasons, we first constructed a model of the price structure of storage devices using actual data and then investigated parameter setting methods based on the results. We also formulated demand and supply functions that take the unused storage space possessed by users and the additional storage space asked by users into account. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to formulate specific demand and supply functions for the P2P data storage system in detail.
Modified User Behavior Model

Price Structure Model for Storage Devices
Here, we analyze the price structure of storage devices using product information of 3.5-inch and 2.5-inch hard disk drives (HDDs) from Kakaku.com for September 29, 2013. The basic data is presented in Table 1 . The relationship between the unit price [yen/GB] and the capacity [GB] for all 3.5-inch and 2.5-inch HDDs is shown by the scatter plot in Fig. 1 . The price structure of HDDs exhibits the same tendency for 3.5-inch and 2.5-inch HDDs as shown in this figure. Furthermore, the log-log plot of that data is linear ( Fig. 1(b) ), so we know that the relationship between the unit price and capacity follows the power law. Therefore, we have the following expression
where p denotes the unit price and q denotes the capacity.
Taking the log of both sides of Eq. (1) to obtain log q = log α − β log p as a regression equation with the explanatory variable log p and the dependent variable log q, we estimated the parameters α and β by applying the least squares method. The estimated values are presented in Table 2 . In the following section, we take q in Eq. (1) as a function of p and denote it as q = c(p) := αp −β .
Setting Price Threshold and Price Sensitivity
Next, we consider a method for setting the price threshold and the price sensitivity of the supply and demand functions for users that possess 3.5-inch HDDs and those that possess 2.5-inch HDDs. Here, we assume that:
• A user buys an HDD in a real market and possesses it of his/her own free will, and then he/she participates in P2P data storage system. • The unit price of the HDD bought in a real market by a user would indicate his/her attitude about the value of storage space per unit.
• Each user rationally behaves on the P2P data storage system in accordance with his/her attitude about the value of storage space per unit.
Under these assumptions, we model the user's behavior in the P2P data storage system based on the information about the property of the HDD possessed by the user and its unit price in real market. To calculate the unit price of the HDD possessed by a user, we utilize the analysis results about the price structure of storage devices given in Sect. 3.1, which is based on the published data in Kakaku.com. Since Kakaku.com is one of the largest Japanese price-comparison websites, we can expect that the price structure of storage devices in Kakaku.com approximates that in a real market. For simplicity, we assume that user i ∈ I possesses either 3.5-inch HDDs or 2.5-inch HDDs. That is, for the set of 3.5-inch HDD users I 3.5 ⊂ I and the set of 2.5-inch HDD users I 2.5 ⊂ I, we assume I = I 3.5 ∪I 2.5 and I 3.5 ∩I 2.5 = ∅. Generally, 3.5-inch HDDs are used in desktop computers and 2.5-inch HDDs are used with laptop computers, so I 3.5 and I 2.5 correspond to the set of desktop and laptop system users, respectively.
Since we assume that each user rationally behaves on the P2P data storage system in accordance with his/her attitude about the value of storage space, each user would not be willing to buy/sell storage space if the unit price is higher/lower than the maximum/minimum unit price for HDDs available in a real market. Thus, the price threshold can be determined easily from Table 1 . That is, if user i possesses a 3.5-inch HDD, i.e., i ∈ I 3.5 , p The price sensitivity can be determined by using Eq. (1). First, let q i be the capacity of the HDD possessed by user i. In that case, we know from Eq. (1) that user i purchased that HDD for the unit price of c −1 (q i ) = (q i /α) −1/β . Accordingly, we can consider the supply function for user i to be a straight line (the red line in Fig. 2 ) from point (p
The supply function can be used to find:
• The storage space that user i, who has no restrictions on the sale of storage space, would be willing to sell for a given unit buying price.
• The unit selling price offered by user i, who has no restrictions on the sale of storage space, for a given demand.
• The unit selling price to be offered by user i for one additional unit of storage space under the condition that a given amount of storage space has already been sold.
Similarly, the demand function for user i can be considered as a straight line (the blue line in Fig. 2 ) that connects point (p max i , 0) and point (c
. The demand function can be used to find:
• The storage space that user i, who possesses no storage capacity at all, would be willing to buy for a given unit selling price.
• The unit buying price offered by user i, who possesses no storage capacity at all, for a given supply.
• The unit buying price to be offered by user i for one additional unit of storage space under the condition that a given amount of storage space has already been bought.
Supply Function Modified for Unused Storage Space
Consider the case in which user i possesses a storage device with unused space ϕ. Since user i is already using a storage space of q i − ϕ, the value of unit storage space for user i is s
User i can sell all of or part of the unused storage space to the operator by taking the unit price p o offered by the operator into account. That is, when the unit price p o offered by the operator is higher than the current value of unused storage space s 
holds. From the above discussion, the modified supply function that represents the storage capacity that user i would be willing to sell to the operator when the unit price offered is p o can be expressed with ϕ as a parameter as follows (see Fig. 3 ). 
Next, let us denote the probability density function of ϕ for user i as f i (ϕ). Then, the averaged supply function of user i is defined as follows.
The derivation of Eq. (2) is given in Appendix A. To execute the above integration, we need to define f i (ϕ) explicitly. However, it is difficult to obtain the explicit definition of f i (ϕ) because the definition should depend on individual circumstances and other external factors. Finding the explicit definition of f i (ϕ) is beyond the scope of this paper. Here, as a simple example, let us assume the probability that user i possesses a storage device with unused space ϕ is uniform. Specifically, we assume that the unused storage space follows a uniform distribution over (0, q i ). In this example, the averaged supply function of user i is given as follows.
The derivation of Eq. (3) is also given in Appendix A. Graphs of Eq. (3) for q i = 100, 200, 500, and 1000 are given in Fig. 5 , where we used the values of parameters given in Sect. 3.2.
Demand Function Modified for Additional Storage Space Asked
Consider the case in which user i asks storage space ψ in addition to the capacity of the user's own storage device, q i . Here, let us remind ourselves of the assumption given in Sect. 3.2 that the user's own storage device was bought by the user before participating in P2P data storage system. In addition, let us remind ourselves that the usage of the demand function given in Sect. 3.2 that the unit buying price to be offered by user i for one additional unit of storage space is given by using the demand function as d
i (q i ) under the condition that the user has already bought storage space with capacity of q i . These points indicate that user i would ask additional storage space ψ in P2P data storage system under the condition that the unit buying price of the additional storage space is the same as that of the user's own storage device bought by the user in real market. Therefore, supposing that user i is already using all of the capacity they possess, q i , the value of unit storage space that the user is willing to pay for additional storage capacity ψ is d
Accordingly, the new demand function for user i is the
) is the price sensitivity, which depends on ψ. Note thatb i,ψ > b i holds. This means that user i is going to buy the additional storage space at P2P data storage system at cheaper unit price than that of a real market. This is just the incentive for user i to participate in the P2P data storage system, which shows the validity of the new demand functiond i,ψ (p). Thus, in the situation where user i is already using all of his or her storage capacity q i , the value of unit storage space for user i is changed tod 
From the above discussion, the modified demand function that represents the storage capacity that user i would be willing to buy from the operator when the unit selling price is p s can be expressed with ψ as a parameter as follows (see Fig. 4 ). 
Next, let us denote the probability density function of ψ for user i as g i (ψ). Then, the averaged supply function of user i is defined as follows.
The derivation of Eq. (4) is given in Appendix B. To execute the above integration, we need to define g i (ψ) explicitly. However, it is difficult to obtain the explicit definition of g i (ψ) because the definition should depend on individual circumstances and other external factors. Finding the explicit definition of g i (ψ) is beyond the scope of this paper. Here, as a simple example, let us assume the probability that user i asks storage space ψ in addition to the capacity of the user's own storage device is uniform. Specifically, we assume that the additional storage space asked follows a uniform distribution over (0, q i ). In this example, the averaged demand function of user i is given as follows.
The derivation of Eq. (5) is also given in Appendix B. Graphs of Eq. (5) for q i = 100, 200, 500, and 1000 are given in Fig. 5 , where we used the values of parameters given in Sect. 3.2.
Application
In this section, we provide a typical application of the modified supply and demand functions. Specifically, we conduct numerical analysis of the social welfare per user and its breakdown when the transactions of storage space in a P2P data storage system is made based on a symmetric scheme and a profit-oriented pricing scheme. The aim of the numerical analysis is to provide a demonstration that the user behavior model given in this paper enables us to provide quantitative evaluation of incentive mechanisms. Since the purpose of this paper is to present modified supply and demand functions that represent user behavior in P2P data storage system well, through this demonstration, we show the user behavior model given in this paper is useful for market design to maintain the P2P data storage system.
Definition of Social Welfare Per User
The social welfare per user [1] is defined using Eqs. (3) and (5) as 
On the other hand, p o i and p s i in the symmetric scheme are defined as a solution of the following optimization problem [1] . 
Note that the social welfare per user includes the normalized operator's profit since
holds.
Distribution of Capacity of Storage Devices
We assume two types of distribution of capacity of storage devices possessed by user i, q i , i.e., we assume the capacity follows a uniform distribution over (c(p max i ), c(p min i )) or follows a distribution proportional to the number of kinds of products that appeared in Kakaku.com. The distribution of the number of kinds of products that appeared in Kakaku.com is shown in Fig. 6 , where the horizontal axis indicates the capacity and the vertical axis indicates the complementary share of storage devices. The complementary share is defined as the ratio of the number of storage devices of which the total storage capacity is more than the corresponding capacity of the number of all storage devices that appeared in Kakaku.com. As shown in Fig. 6 , the relationship between the complementary share and the quantity is almost linear for a single logarithmic plot. This indicates that the relationship between the capacity q and the complementary share r is given as
Therefore, we estimated the values of μ and λ under the conditions n max /n all = μe , where n max denotes the number of products that appeared in Kakaku.com of which the capacity is c −1 (p min ), and n all denotes the number of all products that appeared in Kakaku.com. The result of this estimation is shown in Table 3. Tables 4 and 5 show the numerical results for |I| = 10, 000. The capacity of storage device of user i is determined based on a distribution given in the previous section. For reference, the supply and demand functions that are the numerical average of Eqs. (3) and (5) over a distribution of the capacity of storage devices are shown in Figs. 7(a) and (b), respectively. As shown in these tables, the social welfare per user of the profit-oriented pricing scheme is larger than that of the symmetric scheme regardless of the distribution of the capacity of storage devices possessed by users. This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that the normalized operator's profit is a constituent part of the social welfare per user and is maximized in the profit-oriented pricing scheme based on complete information about user behavior (i.e., σ i (·) andδ i (·), ∀i ∈ I). Therefore, the maximization of the normalized operator's profit in the profit-oriented pricing scheme has a tendency to make the social welfare larger than the symmetric scheme because the symmetric scheme cannot use complete information about user behavior for the optimization.
Numerical Evaluation of Social Welfare Per User
In addition, the social welfare per user of the profitoriented pricing scheme is mostly taken up by the normalized operator's profit. That is, the proportion of the normalized operator's profit to the social welfare per user is very high. Note that the social welfare per user of the symmetric scheme coincides with the user's utility because transactions in this scheme are not mediated by operator. Since storage space of individual users must be provided to establish the P2P data storage system, it is not preferable that the user's utility is excessively low. From this viewpoint, the symmetric scheme is better than the profit-oriented pricing scheme although the social welfare per user of the symmetric scheme is smaller than that of the profit-oriented pricing scheme.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we constructed a user behavior model that represents the relationship between supply and demand for transactions of storage space in a P2P data storage system in which many unspecified users share their own storage space. First, we constructed a price structure model of storage devices using product information that appeared in Kakaku.com. Then, we proposed a method for setting the price threshold and price sensitivity of the supply and demand functions. In addition, we modified the supply and demand functions by taking the unused storage space and the additional storage space asked into consideration. The numerical results showed that the user's utility is excessively low (i.e., the operator's profit is excessively high) in the profit-oriented pricing scheme although the social welfare per user of the symmetric scheme is smaller than that of the profit-oriented pricing scheme. Establishing a method to achieve a good balance between the operator's profit and the user's utility is for future study. Note that the above integration can be executed only when
